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    Correa</a>, Linda Goldberg, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ritt-
    keerati.htm">Ritt Keerati</a>, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/juan-
    m-londono.htm">Juan M. Londono</a>, and Fabiola Ravazzolo<a name="f1"></a><br><br>The
    U.S. dollar continues to occupy a central role in the global economy. It remains the
    most widely used currency in foreign exchange transactions and cross-border payments,
    the leading currency in official reserve holdings, and the dominant currency of
    denomination for international debt securities and loans. This dominant position
    reflects several enduring features of the U.S. economy and financial system,
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    <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/giuseppe-
    fiori.htm">Giuseppe Fiori</a>, Colleen Lipa, and Erik Nuenninghoff<br><br>The current
    artificial intelligence (AI) investment boom in the United States provides a powerful
    boost to imports of high-technology capital goods. The AI buildout bears the
    hallmarks of an investment-specific technology shock&#8212;a process in which rapid
    technological progress makes each new generation of capital equipment significantly
    cheaper and more powerful than the last, but where reaping those efficiency gains
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  <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/shaghil-ahmed.htm">Shaghil Ahmed</a>, Ozge Akinci, and <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/albert-queralto.htm">Albert Queralto</a><a name="f1"></a><br><br>The cross-border spillover effects of shifts in U.S. monetary policy have long been a focus of academics and policymakers alike. A common finding in the literature is that changes in the stance of U.S. monetary policy have sizable effects on economic activity and financial markets in emerging market economies (EMEs). ]]>
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    <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/geng-li.htm">Geng Li</a><a name="f2"></a><br><br>From the era of the Industrial Revolution, industrialized economies were blessed with a number of major technology advancements that profoundly changed production and services in essentially all industries. Because of their universal, far-reaching impacts, such technologies are often referred to as &#8220;General Purpose Technologies&#8221; (GPT). ]]>
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    <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/cody-f-kallen.htm">Cody
      Kallen</a><br><br>In 2025, U.S. tariffs rose sharply, contributing to record-high
      trade and economic policy uncertainty. Part of the motivation for the tariffs
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      into the United States. ]]>
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    <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/mary-frances-
      styczynski.htm">Mary-Frances Styczynski</a><br><br>Retail sweeps emerged in the 1990s
      as a way for depository institutions (DIs) to reduce the cost of satisfying federally
      mandated reserve requirements. Retail sweeps grew, even as the cost of satisfying
      reserve requirements was minimized with the beginning of interest on reserves in
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    <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/phillip-monin.htm">Phillip
      J. Monin</a><a name="f1"></a><br><br>Between 2023 and September 2025, large hedge
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funds&#39; gross U.S. Treasury exposures doubled to \$4.0 trillion, comprising \$2.4 trillion in long exposure and \$1.6 trillion in short exposure. This growth outpaced that of the broader Treasury market, with hedge funds&#39; Treasury securities holdings increasing from about 4.5 percent to about 8.5 percent of total outstanding Treasuries. ]]>

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<![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/maria-aristizabal-ramirez.htm">Maria Aristizabal-Ramirez</a>, Chris A. Avalos, Emma Rosenbaum, and <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/eva-van-leemput.htm">Eva Van Leemput</a> <a name="f1"></a><br><br>In the wake of the 2018&#8211;19 U.S.-China tariff hikes, there has been a significant shift in U.S. supply chains, with Mexico emerging as the largest supplier of U.S. imports, surpassing China. This shift has been attributed in part to Mexico gaining a cost advantage over China following the U.S tariffs on China. ]]>

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<title>FEDS Note: "Buy Now, Pay Later" Beyond "Pay in 4", A Comprehensive Product Overview</title>

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<![CDATA[ Nina R. Acree, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/kayleigh-n-barnes.htm">Kayleigh Barnes</a>, Alexander Bruce, Simona M. Hannon<a name="f\\*"></a> <br><br>The emergence and rapid growth of "Buy Now, Pay Later" (BNPL) services represent a novel financial development in the consumer credit landscape, reflecting evolving payment preferences and changes in point-of-sale financing arrangements. While BNPL providers offer a menu of credit products typically at the point of sale (such as a range of short- and longer-term installment loans in addition to the signature "pay in 4" plans), the nascent literature on BNPL has centered on "pay in 4" products, focusing on user characteristics and usage consequences. ]]>

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 <![CDATA[ Ronel Elul, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/karen-m-pence.htm">Karen Pence</a>, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ben-ranish.htm">Ben Ranish</a>, and <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/michael-suher.htm">Michael Suher</a><br><br>Mortgage servicing right (MSR) valuations decrease when mortgage default and prepayment rates increase, as is generally the case when the economy enters into recession. To estimate how large these MSR valuation declines could be for the banking sector in a severe economic downturn, we project the potential increase in default and prepayment rates under the supervisory stress test models and scenarios for mortgages serviced by large banks. ]]>
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 <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/friederike-niepmann.htm">Friederike Niepmann</a>, Leslie Sheng Shen, and Joshua Walker<a name="f\\*"></a><br><br>Geopolitical risk has emerged as a central driver of global financial markets, with episodes such as Russia's invasion of Ukraine and recent conflicts in the Middle East triggering sharp movements in asset prices and increases in market volatility. But not all industries are exposed to such shocks in the same way (Caldara and Iacoviello 2022; Culver, Niepmann, and Shen 2025). ]]>
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 <![CDATA[ <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/francois-de-soyres.htm">François de Soyres</a>, Ece Fisgin, Ana Maria Santacreu, <a href="https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/eva-van-leemput.htm">Eva Van Leemput</a> and Kevin Vega<a name="f1"></a><br><br>China's accession to the World Trade

Organization in 2001 marked the beginning of one of the most consequential episodes in the history of global trade. The subsequent surge in Chinese exports&#8211;often referred to as the "China Shock"&#8211;has been widely associated with large adjustments in production patterns, labor markets, and trade balances across the global economy (Autor et al. 2016; Pierce and Schott 2016). ]>

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